The $128 Billion Train to Nowhere
California's high-speed rail, measured against the countries that actually build trains
In 2008, California voters approved a $33 billion bond to build high-speed rail between Los Angeles and San Francisco. Eighteen years later, the project has produced zero miles of operational track, the budget has quadrupled, and the latest business plan envisions a train from Gilroy to Palmdale — at a total system cost of $128 billion.
"Who would use such a thing?"
For context, here is what other countries have built with comparable — or far less — money.
Table 1. High-Speed Rail Systems at a Glance
| System | Miles | Cost | $/Mile | Years | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| California HSR | 500 | $128B | $256M | 18+ | 0 mi running |
| Japan Tokaido Shinkansen | 320 | ~$10B | $31M | 5 | Since 1964 |
| Japan full network | 1,900 | ~$100B | $53M | 60 | Operational |
| France TGV network | 1,740 | ~$75B | $43M | 45 | Since 1981 |
| Spain AVE network | 2,400 | ~$65B | $27M | 34 | Since 1992 |
| Morocco Al Boraq | 220 | $2.4B | $11M | 6 | Since 2018 |
All costs inflation-adjusted to approximate 2024 dollars where applicable. Japan Tokaido figure reflects original construction only. Full network figures include phased expansion over decades.
California's cost per mile is 23 times Morocco's and nearly 5 times the average cost of Japan's Shinkansen network. Even accounting for higher American labor costs, land prices, and environmental standards, the gap is staggering.
Table 2. Cost Per Mile, Ranked
| System | $/Mile (M) | |
|---|---|---|
| California HSR | $256 | |
| UK HS2 (truncated) | $200 | |
| Japan Shinkansen (avg) | $53 | |
| France TGV (avg) | $43 | |
| Spain AVE (avg) | $27 | |
| Morocco Al Boraq | $11 |
UK HS2 included for comparison as another troubled Anglophone project. Japan's Chuo Maglev ($315M/mi) excluded — it's a next-generation magnetic levitation system, not conventional rail.
Table 3. Taxpayer Burden Per Household
| Country | HSR Miles | Total Cost | Households | Per Household |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| California | 0 running | $128B | 13M | ~$9,000 |
| Japan (full) | 1,900 | ~$100B | 55M | ~$1,800 |
| Spain (full) | 2,400 | ~$65B | 19M | ~$3,400 |
| France (full) | 1,740 | ~$75B | 30M | ~$2,500 |
| Morocco | 220 | $2.4B | 8M | ~$300 |
California per-household figure assumes full state funding of the $93B gap. Actual taxpayer burden depends on future federal contributions. Japan's Shinkansen is now largely self-financing through JR Group (privatized 1987).
The Morocco Comparison
While California was producing its 152,000 pages of environmental reports and cycling through consultants, Morocco broke ground on the Al Boraq TGV in 2011 and opened it in 2018 — Africa's first high-speed line, running at 200 mph from Tangier to Casablanca.
Total cost: $2.4 billion. That is roughly what California has spent on consultant fees alone.
The company that built Morocco's line? SNCF — France's state-owned railroad operator. They had come to California first, hoping to help build the bullet train. After the state repeatedly ignored their recommendations, SNCF pulled out in 2011 and went to North Africa instead. Within seven years, they had a functioning high-speed rail system running in Morocco.1
1 "SNCF was very angry. They told the state they were leaving for North Africa, which was less politically dysfunctional." — Dan McNamara, SNCF project manager. Business Insider, Oct 10, 2022; original reporting by The New York Times, Oct 9, 2022.Meanwhile, WSP — the lead consultant that stayed — maintained 470 staff on the California project while the state itself had only 180 employees, many of whom reported to the consultants rather than overseeing them. The consultants who left built a train. The ones who stayed billed $427,000 per engineer per year.2
2 Ralph Vartabedian, "How California's faltering high-speed rail project was 'captured' by costly consultants," Los Angeles Times, April 26, 2019. State auditor cited consultant conflicts 81 times in Report 2018-108.What $128 billion buys elsewhere: Japan's full 1,900-mile Shinkansen network, plus Morocco's TGV, plus enough left over to fund free UC tuition for 1 million students.
Table 4. California HSR Timeline
| Year | Event | Cost Est. |
|---|---|---|
| 2008 | Prop 1A passes (52.7%). Promise: LA–SF in 2h40m by 2020. | $33B |
| 2012 | Estimate revised. Completion pushed to 2029. | $68B |
| 2015 | Central Valley construction begins. WSP gets $700M contract. | $68B |
| 2018 | Morocco opens Al Boraq. 200 mph. $2.4B. Done. | — |
| 2019 | Newsom scales back to Merced–Bakersfield. State audit excoriates oversight. | $77B |
| 2024 | 119 miles of track in Central Valley. None operational. | $100B+ |
| 2026 | New plan: high-speed only Gilroy–Palmdale. Trip time ~6 hrs (≈ driving). | $128B |
Full HSR as originally promised would now cost an estimated $231 billion, per the 2026 business plan. The $128B figure reflects engineering and route compromises including single-track segments, steeper grades, and non-high-speed bookends.
Why Does California's Rail Cost So Much?
Environmental review. CEQA and NEPA compliance generated over 152,000 pages of reports across 11 geographic sectors and consumed years before any construction began. Japan's original Shinkansen broke ground before environmental review was complete.
Consultant capture. The rail authority had just 10 employees in 2008 and outsourced virtually everything to firms like WSP, who billed $427,000 per engineer versus $131,000 for state staff. The consultants lease the authority's offices, host its data on their servers, and manage other consultants — an arrangement the state auditor described as a fundamental conflict of interest.2
2 California State Auditor, Report 2018-108. PECG data on consultant vs. in-house costs from 2010 budget documents.Political fragmentation. Every county, municipality, farm, and interest group has effective veto power over routing decisions. Eminent domain battles with Central Valley landowners added years and billions. In Morocco, royal decree cleared the path. In Japan, national interest law streamlines acquisition.
No accountability. WSP estimated $33B in 2008. The project is now $95B over that number. WSP received a new $700M contract in 2015. No firm has been penalized for the overruns. As Governor Newsom asked in 2019: "How did we get away with this?"
Sources
- California High-Speed Rail Authority, 2026 Business Plan — revised costs, route, funding gap
- Ralph Vartabedian, "The bullet train to… Gilroy," L.A. Reported, March 17, 2026
- Ralph Vartabedian, "How California's faltering high-speed rail project was 'captured' by costly consultants," Los Angeles Times, April 26, 2019
- "A French company helping California's high speed-rail project left for North Africa," Business Insider, October 10, 2022 (sourcing The New York Times, October 9, 2022)
- California State Auditor, Report 2018-108 — consultant oversight assessment
- ONCF (Morocco), Al Boraq project data
- Japan Railway Technical Service — Tokaido Shinkansen historical costs
- Bent Flyvbjerg (Oxford) — mega-project governance research
- Professional Engineers in California Government — cost comparison data
- Louis Thompson, former chair, HSR Peer Review Panel — trip time estimates
Just a Californian who looked at the numbers.